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FEDERAL MORAL RIGHTS FOR VISUAL
ARTISTS: CONTRACT THEORY AND
ANALYSIS
Russ VerSteeg*
This Article is intended neither as an introduction to contract prin-
ciples for visual artists nor as a comprehensive analysis or study of art
law contracts. Nor is this Article intended as a "how to negotiate a
contract" manual for visual artists with annotations and forms.'
Works such as these already exist and are available for both attorneys
and artists.2 Furthermore, this Article is not an exhaustive treatment
of the philosophical, political and sociological forces that shaped the
American recognition of moral rights for visual artists under the
United States Copyright Act.3 Instead, this Article looks critically at
the immediate, potential effect that the Visual Artists Rights Act4 can
have on visual artists in drafting and negotiating their contracts with
printers, co-authors, galleries, auctioneers, museums, consignees, bail-
ees, and other purchasers. In short, the Article concentrates on how
artists and those who contract with them can use the Visual Artists
Rights Act (Act) intelligently in negotiating and drafting agreements.
* Assistant Professor, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; A.B. 1979,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1987, University of Connecticut School of
Law. I would like to thank Curt Nyquist, Gary L. Monserud, Amy Cohen, Ed Dantich,
Alphonse Squillante, and Dave Kennedy, who read and commented on an earlier draft of this
article. I would also like to thank John Cusano and the entire Committee on Arts and the Law
of the Connecticut Bar Association who answered and asked many questions about the practical
and legal aspects of this topic when the idea was beginning to take shape. In addition, I would
like to thank my research assistant, Sandra Paul.
1. This Article does, however, offer a few suggested contract provisions that might prove
useful for visual artists and others involved in buying, selling, and otherwise transacting business
in art.
2. A number of works are extremely valuable to artists and lawyers. See, eg., FLOYD
CONNER ET AL., THE ARTIST'S FRIENDLY LEGAL GUIDE (1988); LEONARD D. DuBoFF, ART
LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1984); LEONARD D. DuBoFF, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (1977 & Supp.
1984); FRANKLIN FELDMAN ET AL., ART LAW (1986 & Supp. 1988); RALPH E. LERNER &
JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: A GUIDE FOR COLLECrORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND
ARTISTS (1989).
3. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-914 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992). For an excellent overview of these
types of considerations, see Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward A
Federal System of Moral Rights Protection For Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945 (1990)
[hereinafter Damich, VARA 1990].
4. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (title VI of
the Judicial Improvements Act) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.A.); see in particular
§§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (1991).
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In Part I, the Article briefly examines the recognition of moral
rights in the United States, summarizes the history and general scope
of the Act, probes the subject matter that the Act defines as "work[s]
of visual art," and gives an overview of the "moral rights" that the Act
makes available to artists.' Part II discusses the potential interface
between contract law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Act.
Part II also describes ways that artists and parties who contract with
artists can take advantage of the new moral rights during the bargain-
ing and drafting processes.
I. OVERVIEW
A. History
Many European communities, especially those countries that have
adopted the Berne Convention,6 have long recognized the concept of
droit moral, an artist's right of integrity, attribution, disclosure, and
withdrawal.' These rights, which, in part, originate in the European
5. The Act actually refers to "authors" not "artists," a term "undoubtedly chosen because it
is used in the Copyright Act, of which the Visual Artists Rights Act is an amendment." Damich,
VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 964. This Article generally employs the terms "artist" and "artists"
to refer to the people whom the Act calls "author" and "authors."
6. The roots of the Berne Convention in Europe can be traced back over one hundred years.
In 1878 at the Universal Exposition in Paris, the French Societe d.s Gens de Lettres invited
other nations to participate in an International Literary Congress. The International Literary
Association grew from the initial meetings in Paris in the summer of 1878 and continued to hold
meetings in major European cities between 1878 and 1885. The Swiss government invited the
Association to meet in Berne. R. i BowKER & THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT: ITS LAW
AND ITs LITERATURE 26 (1986). Additional meetings were held in Berne in 1883 and 1884. Id.
On September 9, 1886, at the 1886 Berne meeting, the Association adopted the original Berne
Convention. See BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 715 (Stephen
Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990). Since 1886, the Berne Convention has undergone
numerous revisions. The major revisions were: (1) in Paris (1896); (2) in Berlin (1908); (3) in
Berne (1914); (4) in Rome (1928); (5) in Brussels (1948); (6) in Stockholm (1967); and (7) in
Paris (1971). Minor amendments to the 1971 Paris Convention were added in 1979. Id.
7. House Report 514 which accompanied the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 emphasizes
that the rights afforded by the new law
are analogous to those protected by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which are
commonly known as "moral rights." "The theory of moral rights is that they result in a
climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the author in the arduous act of
creation." Artists' rights are consistent with the purpose behind the copyright laws and the
Constitutional provision they implement: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts ...."
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915 (foot-
notes omitted).
For a more complete discussion of moral rights in general, see John H. Merryman, The Refrig-
erator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976); Dan Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A
European Evolution, an American Revolution, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (1983). For a
more detailed treatment of the legislative path of the Act and analyses of the Act's provisions, see
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view that artistic creations are the product of an artist's personality,'
reflect a recognition that artists are entitled to control their works of
art in ways that persons who produce other types of personal property
cannot. Simply stated, the theory of droit moral holds that artists have
a number of substantive rights that are "personal" but not necessarily
"economic." 9 These rights are: 1) the author's right of integrity: the
right to insist that her work not be distorted, mutilated, or destroyed;
2) the right of attribution:10 the author's right to be publicly recog-
nized as the author of her work; 3) the right of disclaimer (the logical
counterpart to the right of attribution): the artist's right to disclaim
authorship of any work that is not hers; 4) the right of disclosure: the
legal recognition that it is the artist who has the prerogative to decide
Edward J. Damich, A Critique of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, 14 NOVA L. REv. 407
(1990); Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Cri-
tique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (1984); Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3; Russell J. DaSilva,
Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison ofArtists' Rights in France and the United
States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1980); Karen Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A
Critique of the California Art Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 873 (1981); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress Commentary on the
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477 (1990); Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation:
The Need For Caution, 14 NOVA L. REv. 421 (1990); Jack A. Cline, Note, Moral Rights: The
Long and Winding Road Toward Recognition, 14 NOVA L. REV. 435 (1990).
8. There are three broad theories that explain why ownership of intangible rights such as
those protected by the Copyright Act should be considered private property. Copyright can
be considered either (1) a "natural" right, (2) an artificial right created by the legislature
and the judiciary, or (3) a personal right integral to an artist's very identity.
Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1539 (1989) (empha-
sis added). The natural rights theory originated with the labor theory of property propounded by
John Locke. Id. Since its beginnings, legal scholars such as Blackstone and, more recently, the
late Professor Melville Nimmer, whose multi-volume treatise on copyright is the standard by
which all others are judged, have embraced a natural rights explanation for the underpinnings of
copyright. Id. at 1540. The U.S. Supreme Court has apparently adopted the second theory (i.e.,
that copyright is the product of the legislature and the judiciary), stating that copyright is "the
creature of the Federal statute" (i.e., the Copyright Act) and that "Congress did not sanction an
existing right but created a new one." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see
also Lacey, supra this note, at 1541. The German philosopher, Hegel, is primarily responsible for
the third theory: the view that intangible properties like copyrights are "the embodiment of per-
sonality," a view shared and advanced by Imanuel Kant. I. Kant, Of the Injustice in Counterfeit-
ing Books, in I ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND VARIOUS
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 225, 229-30 (W. Richardson trans., 1798); Lacey, supra, this note at
1541 (citing G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 51 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952)); see also Margaret
J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Martin A. Roeder, The Doc-
trine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554
(1940).
9. See infra notes 87-102 and accompanying text regarding the characterization of moral
rights as "personal" versus the standard "economic" bundle of rights granted through § 106 of
the Copyright Act.
10. Also referred to as the right of "paternity." The author has made a conscious decision to
use the non-sexist term "attribution."
Washington Law Review
when, and indeed, whether to unveil her work for others to view; and,
5) the right of withdrawal (the corollary right to the right of disclo-
sure): the artist's power to determine when and whether to remove a
work from the public (or perhaps even from a private individual).
These rights are the conventional moral rights that many European
countries typically have recognized.11
The United States, on the other hand, has only recently considered
federal legislation relating to an artist's moral rights. An important
precursor to the Act was the Berne Convention Implementation Act
(BCIA). The initial drafts of the BCIA included moral rights, but the
moral rights provisions met with strong opposition from corporate
interests who feared that moral rights would impede the production
and distribution of copyrighted works. The Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America, the Information Industry of America, and Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp., for example, advocated adoption of
Berne without any moral rights provisions.12 In addition, other nota-
ble groups, organizations, and businesses opposed the adoption of
moral rights as part of the United States' adherence to Berne: the
Magazine Publishers Association, the American Society of Magazine
Editors, the Coalition to Preserve American Copyright Tradition,
McGraw-Hill, Playboy, Time, Triangle Publications, and Turner
Broadcasting. These entities argued that moral rights for authors
would compel editors in the media to check all editorial revisions with
both the producers and authors prior to moving forward. 13
The BCIA passed only after both the House and Senate Committees
concluded that United States law already possessed the kind of moral
rights included in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. House Report
608 stated that "[b]ased on a comparison of its laws with those of
Berne member countries, and on the current status of Federal and
State protections of the rights of paternity and integrity, the Commit-
tee finds that current United States law meets the requirements of
Article 6bis."14 Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director General of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reached similar conclu-
sions regarding the scope of pre-Berne U.S. law. 5 Congress took the
position that section 106(2) of the Copyright Act, section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act 16, "artists' rights" statutes passed by several states, and a
11. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
12. At Issue; Copyright Fight Resumes in Congress, L.A. TIMES, March 14, 1988, at 6.
13. Id.
14. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988).
15. Id.




number of judicial decisions recognizing rights equivalent to Article
6bis combined to create sufficient moral rights protection for domestic
artists. 17
The Copyright Act provides that "the owner of copyright... has
the exclusive ight... to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work."18 At least one commentator has argued that this
provision can function as the equivalent of the right of integrity if a
derivative work significantly alters the original.19 This reasoning is
based primarily on Gilliam v. American Broadcasting, Inc.2° In Gil-
liam, the Second Circuit held that "the economic incentive for artistic
and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American
copyright law... cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to
obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the
public on which the artists are financially dependent."21 Thus, when
artists own the copyright to their works, as was true in Gilliam, they
may sue for copyright infringement when a contractually authorized
use of the work mutilates or misrepresents the original to the extent
that the economic rights of ownership may be harmed. Gilliam may
be construed as having recognized a right of integrity because the
copyright owner (who could be the author) maintains an economic
interest in the work. The right of integrity recognized in Gilliam may
also be construed to extend to authors even after they have transferred
ownership of their copyrights because they retain a beneficial interest
in the work.22 This beneficial right arises, arguably, from 17 U.S.C.
§ 203 which gives authors, other than authors of works made for hire,
the right to terminate the transfer of the copyright after thirty-five
years. Although this right is subject to a number of formalities and
conditions, authors cannot waive their right of termination.23
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, includ-
ing words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce,
17. H.R. REp. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988).
18. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1992).
19. Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REv. 1, 38-45 (1985).
20. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
21. Id. at 24.
22. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (1977 & Supp. 1992).
23. See id. § 203(3) (West 1977); Kwall, supra note 19, at 47-56.
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and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designa-
tion of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same
to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier
to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the
region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false descrip-
tion or representation.
24
Courts have applied section 43(a) to situations where parties have
incorrectly attributed authorship,25 and also to situations of "reverse
palming off," when authorship is not attributed to one of the authors
of a jointly authored work.26
Congress' willingness to equate Article 6bis with the totality of
applicable law in the United States must be taken with a grain of salt.
One important purpose of the BCIA was to give U.S. copyright own-
ers greater protection in the world market. The BCIA was also
intended to give U.S. interests a more powerful role in shaping inter-
national copyright law. Congress' "minimalist approach" shows
clearly that Congress wanted to attain the maximum benefits that
adherence to Berne could bring while shouldering the minimum bur-
dens. If there had been equivalence to Berne, in fact, then Congress
had no valid reason to avoid adopting any of Berne's moral rights pro-
visions. In reality, when the United States adopted Berne, only a spec-
ulative construction of U.S. law brought U.S. authors within the ambit
of Berne's moral rights protections. Authors had no express right of
attribution unless they contracted for it.27 Interestingly enough, the
Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention
argued that authors may have had a cause of action based on an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when their rights of
attribution were denied.2" No U.S. court, however, had ever so found.
At the time of the BCIA, the only plausible cause of action was for a
misleading attribution of the type found in Lamothe v. Atlantic
Recording Corp. 29 United States law also failed to recognize a right of
integrity absent a valid contractual provision. Even the Gilliam deci-
sion-oft-quoted for the protection it offers the right of integrity-
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982).
25. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith
v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604-07 (9th Cir. 1981).
26. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. MELVILLE 3. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[E] (1990).
28. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
reprinted in 10 CoLuM.-VLA JL. & ARTs 1, 40 (1986) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Report].
29. 847 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1988).
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states that "American copyright law, as presently written, does not
recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation,
since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the per-
sonal, rights of authors."3
Of the four prongs of protections that were supposed to make
United States law equivalent to Article 6bis, the state legislation was
probably the strongest. However, states enacted those statutes pre-
cisely because they perceived a void in federal protection. Congres-
sional reliance on the state statutes, moreover, was inapposite for two
reasons. First, only eight states had enacted moral rights statutes.
Second, Article 6bis (3) requires that "[t]he means of redress for safe-
guarding the rights granted by this Article (i.e., moral rights) shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed."3 The comment to Article 6bis(3) refers to "legislation of
the country" as "national law," thereby making it clear that the moral
rights protections of Article 6bis ought to be embodied in federal law
not a patchwork of state laws. The extraordinarily tenuous nature of
Congress' conclusion that United States authors already possessed
rights equivalent to Article 6bis when it adopted the BCIA made the
passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act highly desirable for United
States artists. 32
U.S. federal law did not overtly grant any moral rights to artists in
America until June 1, 1991.11 The Act was the product of several
years of congressional debate.34 In specific circumstances, the Act
30. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976).
31. Article 6bis(3) (emphasis added).
32. See also Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 946 n.5.
33. Of the state and federal decisions that Congress believed granted moral rights, the Gilliam
case is probably the best known. However, the Ad Hoc Working Group also cited Geisel v.
Poynter Prods., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), for the proposition that courts have denied
that moral rights exist under U.S. law. See Ad Hoc Report, supra note 28 at 39. At the time of
BCIA passage, at least eight states had enacted some form of artists' rights laws. See CAL. CIv.
CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-56 (West 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp.
1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to 2A:24A-8 (West 1987); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW
§§ 14.51-14.59 (McKinney 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (1987). Congress also noted that some Berne member countries
had even less moral rights protection than the United States. See Ad Hoc Report, supra note 28,
at 44.
34. According to House Report 514, "Bills seeking to protect visual artists dated from 1979,
and H.R. 2400, introduced in the 100th Congress, was designed to grant film directors and screen
writers certain moral rights." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918 (citing numerous House and Senate bills addressing moral rights:
eg., H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. RFc. H7352, E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987)
(statement of Rep. Markey); S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S11,470 (daily ed.
Aug. 6, 1987); H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H3555 (daily ed. May 13,
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confers certain rights on artists (the section 106A rights).35 Initially,
then, since Congress made the Act part of the Copyright Act (i.e., title
17 of the United States Code), the remedies available are remedies pro-
vided under the United States Copyright Act.3 6 Those who take part
in art transactions, however, have the opportunity to enlarge or dimin-
1987); S. 2796, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. Rec. S12,185 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986); H.R.
1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H578 (daily ed. Feb 17, 1983); H.R. 2908, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 5689 (1981); H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REC.
440 (1979)).
President Bush approved the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 on December 1, 1990. 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1965 (1990). President Reagan had signed the BCIA on October
31, 1988 (H.R. 4262) 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1405-06 (Nov. 7, 1988). The BCIA
became effective on March 1, 1989. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
Much of the initial debate over the BCIA revolved around whether moral rights should be
included. The Berne Convention expressly recognizes both the right of attribution and integrity
in Article 6bis. Paragraph (1) of Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights,
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 6bis(1), reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 715, 725 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald
A. Brand eds., 1990). Moral rights, under Berne, survive the transfer of the author's economic
rights.
The issue of whether the copyright owner of film was entitled to colorize it with impunity
advanced to the forefront. In one sense, this issue illustrates the American preference for eco-
nomic rights at the expense of an artist's moral rights. When some complained, for example, that
Ted Turner, who owns the world's largest film library, should not colorize black and white movie
classics, Turner quipped, "The last time I checked, I owned those films." Artists, Newly Militant,
Fight for Their Rights, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1988, at C29, col. 1. James Stewart, testifying
before Congress, said that the colorization of Frank Capra's "It's a Wonderful Life" "broke his
[Capra's] heart." Paul Page, Jimmy Stewart, Burt Lancaster Speak Out for Artists'Rights, Asso-
CIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, March 15, 1988.
When it began to look as though the opponents of including moral rights in the BCIA would
carry the day, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) tried to limit the scope of the BCIA
moral rights to visual arts. He was, however, unable to garner sufficient support at the time.
Howard Fields, Senate Expected to Pass Berne Bill in September, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Sept. 9,
1988, at 68.
In July of 1987, Representative Carlos Moorehead (R-Calif.) introJuced a bill (H.R. 2962),
which was backed by the administration, that contained no moral rights provisions. The Reagan
administration had taken the position that U.S. law was already roughly equivalent to the provi-
sions of Article 6bis. See Administration Officials Back Adherence to Berne Copyright Convention,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 34 (Feb. 22, 1988), supra note 14. In December of 1987,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced Senate Bill 1971. However, the bill that the Senate
ultimately approved was Senate Bill 1301, introduced in May of 1987 by Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.). Senator Leahy's bill did not have any moral rights provisions either. Id.
35. These rights are, generally speaking, the right of attribution and the right of integrity.
For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part I.C.
36. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-11 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992); see also Damich, ARA 1990,
supra note 3, at 949 (commenting that "the damages provisions of the Copyright Act [are]
inappropriate because they are aimed at injury to property rights rather than personal rights").
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ish the scope of the Act's remedies by drafting language that addresses
the section 106A rights in their agreements.37
B. Statutory Subject Matter: A "Work of Visual Art"
The Act specifically defines what types of works are "work[s] of
visual art."'38 This definition is critical to artists. Artists can only take
advantage of the section 106A rights if the work that they create falls
within the scope of the Act's definition. The Act defines a "work of
visual art" as follows:
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying
mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively num-
bered by the author.39
37. In this regard, this Article takes issue with Congress' conclusion that "the civil penalties
provided in title 17 are adequate to redress any violations of the rights of attribution and
integrity." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6932 (emphasis added). Thoughtful proactive measures in a contract can offer far better
protection than title 17 remedies.
38. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1992).
39. Id. This is the same definition that had appeared in earlier bills proposed by Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D.-Wis.). See Damich,
VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 951. House Report 514 notes that the decision to create a narrow
definition was a conscious one. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6919. The subcommittee's hearings "revealed a consensus that the
bill's scope should be limited to certain carefully defined types of works and artists, and that if
claims arising in other contexts are to be considered, they must be considered separately." Id.
House Report 514 stresses that Congress went "to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the
works of art that will be covered . . . ." Id. at 11, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6921 (quoting the
statement of the Honorable Edward Markey at the subcommittee hearings). "The definition is
not synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act and, in particular, it is narrower
than the definition of 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' set forth in 17 U.S.C. 101." Id.
Congress has indicated, however, that a certain degree of common sense and experience must
guide courts when interpreting this definition:
The courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community in determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the definition.
Artists may work in a variety of media, and use a number of materials in creating their
works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls within the definition should not depend
upon the medium or materials used. For example, the term "painting" includes murals,
works created on canvas, and the like. The term "sculpture" includes, but is not limited to,
castings, carvings, modelings, and constructions. Similarly, the term "print" includes works
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The Act also explicitly excludes certain types of works. Any work
that is executed as a "work made for hire"'  cannot be considered a
"work of visual art" within the scope of the Act.41 Furthermore, the
Act's definition of a "work of visual art" does not encompass
(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, elec-
tronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item
or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material
or container; [and] (iii) any portion or part of any item described
[above].42
In addition, any "reproduction, depiction, portrayal or other use of
a work" used in connection with posters, maps, globes, merchandising
items, etc. and works made for hire is not considered a "work of visual
art," although the original of such a reproduction, depiction, or por-
trayal could be considered a work of visual art on its own merits. 4
3
Consequently, the way that someone (a purchaser, for example) uses
an artist's work can affect whether the work will be considered a
such as lithographs, serigraphs, and etchings. The latter term does not, however, cover
photographic prints, which are covered separately.
The photographs encompassed by the definition are those still photographic images
produced for exhibition purposes. The bill covers both positives (for example prints, contact
sheets, and transparencies such as slides) and negatives (negative photographic images or
transparent material used for printing positives) of a photograph. The limitation to "still"
photographic images is intended to ensure that "moving" images, such as those appearing in
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, are not protected under the bill. In fact, those
categories of works are expressly excluded pursuant to subparagraph (1)(A)(1) of the
definition of a work of visual art.
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6921.
One point well worth making is that basic protection under the Act is in no way tied to artistic
merit or value (except for the artist's right to prevent destruction of "a work of recognized stat-
ure"). 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1992). The legislative history notes that "[t]he
Committee appreciates that less well-known or appreciated artists also have honor and reputa-
tions worthy of protection." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6925.
40. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1992). The definition expressly states that "[a] work of
visual art does not include ... any work made for hire .... "d § 101(2)(B).
41. See infra note 79 for a more complete explanation of the concept of "work made for hire."
42. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(2)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
43. The Act states that the § 106A rights
shall not apply to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or
in any connection with any . . . poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine, newspaper,
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication ... any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering,
or packaging material or container ... or any work made for hire ....
Id. §§ 101(2)(A), 101(2)(B), 106A(c)(3).
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"work of visual art" within the Act. For example, if a corporation
were to purchase a large outdoor sculpture, display it in front of its
office building, and were to subsequently adopt it as the company's
logo or trademark, then, arguably, the sculpture itself could no longer
be considered "a work of visual art" since it would then be used for
"advertising [and] promotional purposes." I
This definition has important ramifications for artists. First, in
order for the Act to apply, artists must make sure that the medium in
which they are working is one of the media that the Act contemplates.
The categories of "work[s] of visual art" are exhaustive. The Act in
no way suggests that the drafters intended to open the door to permit
media other than paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and still pho-
tographs.45 Secondly, artists must pay close attention to and observe
the formalities that the Act's definition of "work of visual art"
demands.
In order for a painting, drawing, or print to be considered "a work
of visual art," artists must be certain that the work either (1) be exe-
cuted as a single copy (i.e., the original work itself); or (2) in a case
where an artist wishes to make limited edition copies, she must be
certain to make no more than 200 copies.' In fact, in order to com-
44. See Russ VerSteeg, Iguanas, Toads and Toothbrushes: Land-Use Regulation of Art as
Signage, 25 GA. L. REv. 437, 485 n.195 (1991).
45. The legislative history reinforces this conclusion, stating that the definition "encompasses
certain paintings, drawings, prints, sculpture, and finally, still photographic images produced for
exhibition purposes only. In all cases these works are covered only in single copies or in limited
editions of 200 or fewer copies." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921 (emphasis added). The legislative history does, however, note
that other means of protection are often available to artists if their works fail to meet the § 106A
definition:
Consistent with current law on preemption for economic rights, the new federal law will not
preempt state causes of action relating to works that are not covered by the law, such as
audiovisual works, photographs produced for non-exhibition purposes, and works in which
the copyright has been transferred before the effective date. Similarly, state artists' rights
laws that grant rights not equivalent to those accorded under the proposed law are not
preempted, even when they relate to works covered by [the Act]. For example, the law will
not preempt a cause of action for misattribution of a reproduction of a work of visual art or
for a violation of a right to a resale royalty. Further, State law causes of action such as those
for misappropriation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices,
are not currently preempted under section 301, and they will not be preempted under the
proposed law.
Id. at 21, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6931 (emphasis added).
46. House Report 514 states: "Limited editions, as opposed to reproductions, are comprised
of multiple originals of the same work and are thus deserving of special protection." Id. at 12,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6922 (footnote omitted). Professor Ginsburg criticizes this tenet, noting
that "It]he artist's interest in receiving credit for her creation, and the public's interest in
knowing the creator's identity, do not diminish as the size of the edition increases." Ginsburg,
supra note 7, at 484. Richard Posner and William Landes recognize, nevertheless, that the status
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port with the language of the statute, it might be prudent for an artist
to actually designate those copies as "limited edition," both on the
copies themselves (for example on their reverse) and also on any docu-
ments (e.g., a sales agreement) that refer to them.47
For paintings, drawings, and prints which exist hi "limited edition"
copies, an artist must sign the copies and must number them consecu-
tively.48 The Act itself is ambiguous as to whether an artist must sign
an original (i.e., "single copy") of a painting or drawing. The legisla-
tive history clearly states that "single copies of paintings, drawings,
prints and sculptures need not be signed."49 Nevertheless, the wisest
course will be for artists always to sign their originals, as apparently
most artists do as a matter of custom. 0
of an original or limited edition work of art can be important in terms of whether there is a need
for copyright protection in an open market:
In the case of books and other printed matter, the copier may no, be able to match the
quality of paper or binding of the original or crispness of the printing, and there may be
errors in transcription. None of these is an important impediment to good copies any
longer, but in the case of works of art-such as a painting by afamous artist-a copy, however
accurate, may be such a poor substitute in the market that it will have no negative effects on
the price of the artist's work
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis Of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 329 (1990) (emphasis added).
47. The importance of a paper trail leading to compliance with the statutory definition is
critical. House Report 514, for example, states that "a printmaker who creates a limited edition
must show that the edition consists of 200 or fewer copies." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6923.
48. House Report 514 specifies that "[tihe act of numbering and marking serves to define the
subject matter of the legislation." Id. at 12, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6922.
49. Id. at 13, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6923.
50. In addition to signing works, artists should understand the benefits that accrue from
affixing a copyright notice to all of their works. A proper copyright notice includes three
elements: (1) the author's name (the signature required by the Visual Artists Rights Act would
surely suffice to satisfy this element); (2) the symbol 0, or the word "Copyright," or the
abbreviation "Copr."; and (3) the year of first publication of the work. The legal advantages
that flow from routinely placing a copyright notice on works (as well as the advantages that come
from registering the copyrights to works) are significant. Under the present Copyright Act,
copyright registration is entirely permissive, not mandatory. 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West Supp.
1992). The registration fee is now $20.00. Id. at § 708(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990) Although artists
are not required to place a notice on their works (The statute provides that "a notice of copyright
.. .may be placed on publicly distributed copies." Id. § 401(a) (emphasis added).), the
Copyright Act presently offers worthwhile incentives for artists to continue to place a copyright
notice on their works. Specifically, the Copyright Act provides:
If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this section appears on the
published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access,
then no weight shall be given to such a defendant's interposition of a defense based on
innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages ....
Id. § 401(d). Furthermore, the Copyright Act provides that a registration certificate is prima
facie evidence of a valid copyright in infringement litigation. Id. § 410(c) (1977). In addition, a
plaintiff who has placed a proper copyright notice on a work and has registered it in a timely
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The plain language of the Act states that it is the "author" who
must sign and consecutively number the "limited edition" copies."
The meaning of "consecutively" is unclear. Is it intended to mean that
the number that the author affixes to the copy must correspond
numerically to the order in which the copies were made? If so, it
would be a significant departure from industry custom. As a general
rule, artists do not sign and number copies in the order that they are
made. 2 Rather, the printer makes the copies and then the artist sits
down and numbers them with no thought of their order of produc-
tion. 3 This practice does cause some concern among buyers since
copies produced later, near the end of a relatively large run (e.g., 100
or more), are often of a lesser quality than copies produced earlier in
the run. 4 Consequently, if Congress intended artists to number their
limited editions so that the numbers correspond to their order of pro-
duction, artists will have to change their customary methods of sign-
ing and numbering.
Sculptors who wish to ensure that a work meets the Act's definition
of a "work of visual art" must follow specific procedures. A tradi-
tional sculpture will fall within the Act's definition easily. As is the
case with original paintings and drawings, the statute does not
expressly mandate that artists sign a "single copy."55 The legislative
history explicitly states that "single copies of... sculptures need not
be signed."56 Still, signing a work, or affixing some sort of trademark
or other "identifying mark," is clearly advisable.5 7 In addition, a
fashion may recover statutory damages and attorneys' fees from the infringer. Id. § 504(c)-505
(1988). See also id, § 412 (West Supp. 1992).
51. Id. § 101(1).
52. Statement of John Cusano, Artist, at a regular meeting of the Committee on Arts and the
Law of the Connecticut Bar Association in New Haven, Conn. (Oct. 3, 1991).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(1) (West Supp. 1992). The definition states that a "work of visual art"
is as follows:
a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or in the case of a
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of
the author ....
Id. (emphasis added). The use of the plural verb "are" suggests that the signature requirement
applies only to limited editions and not to single copies. See also supra notes 48-50 and accom-
panying text.
56. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6923; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 50 (explaining why artists ought to place a copyright notice (and therefore
also the name of the author) on their works).
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sculptor must either sign any copies or affix some "other identifying
mark of the author" and number the copies consecutively."
Photographers who want to create works that meet the Act's defini-
tion of a "work of visual art" face peculiar problems. First, the only
type of photograph that can come within the Act's definition is "a still
photographic image." 9 Clearly, for example, a photographer who
prints only one positive picture on paper from a negative produced via
a standard 35mm camera creates a work which could qualify.' More-
over, the term "still photographic image" implies that a single frame
from a motion picture film or even a frozen videotaped image could
qualify for protection under the Act, so long as the artist meets the
other statutory requirements-signing, single copy or limited edition,
and consecutive numbering.6
The phrase "produced for exhibition purposes only" presents a par-
ticularly troublesome issue. According to the Act, in order to be con-
sidered a "work of visual art," a photograph must be "produced for
exhibition purposes only."62 Must photographers intend, at the
nanosecond that they click the shutter, to produce a picture solely for
exhibition?63 What if, in a photographer's mind, she intended not only
to exhibit the work but also to sell it? Would such a dual purpose in
58. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(1) (West Supp. 1992); see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text
for a more complete discussion of the meaning of the word "consecutively."
59. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(1) (West Supp. 1992).
60. Although it is arguable that the photographic negative constites the true "single copy"
and that any prints made from the negative would be copies (i.e., positive images of the negative),
there is nothing in the Act or its legislative history to suggest that such a hyper-technical reading
is warranted. A more reasonable interpretation, given the practical realities of the photographic
development and printing processes, would be to consider the production of a negative as merely
part of the creative process, and to consider the print(s) as the "single copy" or "limited edition
copies."
61. As a general rule, the Act does not recognize motion pictures cr other audiovisual works
as works of visual art. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992). But a frozen image could
be "a work of visual art" protected by the Act as long as that individaal image meets the other
requirements of the Act.
62. Id. § 101(2).
63. Professor Damich poses this hypothetical: "What if Ansel Adams made a positive for his
own use, which he signed, but later, it was sold and exhibited in a museum? Presumably, the
work would not qualify for moral rights protection because it was not intended for exhibition
purposes only." Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 952. Damich views this limitation as
Congress' attempt to impose a standard of "artistic merit." Id at 977. House Report 514
expressly states that "many photographs are produced for use by newspapers and magazines and
for other non-exhibition purposes and are specifically excluded by the definition .... H.R.
REP. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C A.N. 6915, 6921. House
Report 514 continues, noting that:
[t]he nature or location of the exhibition is not relevant to the determination of whether the
photograph is produced for exhibition purposes. In addition, it is the initial purpose for
which the image is produced that controls whether a photograph is covered. Thus, a
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the photographer's mind catapult the photograph forever outside the
scope of the Act? If a photograph is "produced for exhibition pur-
poses only" does that mean that a photographer cannot have had any
motive for creating the work other than exhibition? Such a narrow
reading is patently ridiculous. It is more plausible that Congress
intended the phrase "for exhibition purposes only" to exclude the mil-
lions of ordinary people who take pictures of their families, dogs,
houses, and the like, with no intent to show them to anyone outside of
their normal circle of friends. It makes sense to interpret the word
"exhibition" to mean a general public display rather than a limited
showing to family, friends, and acquaintances." 4 Indeed, although
some photographers may enjoy the luxury of creating photos purely
for exhibition with no thought of profit or other remuneration in
mind, the majority of photographers who care enough about their
work to want to meet the Act's definition of "a work of visual art" are
probably professional photographers who ordinarily produce pictures
with a profit motive in mind. Arguably, the phrase "produced for
exhibition purposes only" should not be interpreted as mutually exclu-
sive of "for purposes of selling."
Alternatively, one could argue that exhibitions of photography, by
their very nature, implicitly entail the notion that the photographs will
be for sale (in addition to being exhibited). Consequently, if one
begins with the premise that exhibitions of photographs ordinarily
occur as a vehicle for offering photographs to the public for sale, it
follows that a sales incentive on the part of the photographer will not
negate the photographs having been produced "for exhibition pur-
poses only."
qualifying photograph will not fall outside the ambit of the bill's protection simply because
it is later used for non-exhibition purposes.
Id. at 12, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6922. Professor Ginsburg views this approach as unfortunate
"because it fails to recognize that some images created for journalistic or similar purposes may
come to be appreciated as works of art." Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 481 n.20.
64. It is unfortunate that Congress failed to define "exhibition." Perhaps the most
appropriate interpretation of the word "exhibition" as it is used in the Act would be to equate it
with the phrase "To ... display a work publicly" which is defined in the Copyright Act as
follows:
To... display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to... display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a... display of the work to a place specified by
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the.., display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977).
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As is the case with painters, drawers, and sculptors, a photographer
should sign any "single copy" and should both sign and consecutively
number any limited edition copies.65 The Act's narrow definition
forces artists to be vigilant if they wish to create works that the Act
will recognize as "work[s] of visual art." As a general rule, artists
should sign every copy (including the original),66 must consecutively
number any copies, must take whatever steps that they possibly can to
make sure that limited edition copies number 200 or less,67 and, in the
case of photographers, they must do what they can to make it clear
that they create works solely for exhibition purposes.
C. The New Moral Rights
On its face, the Act ostensibly grants rights to artists. The Act,
however, merely states that "the author of a work of visual art...
shall have the right to" these new rights. It does not say that an
author shall always receive the practical benefits of these rights by fiat.
The Act grants to an "author of a work of visual art" the following
rights:
1) The Right of Attribution: "to claim authorship" of a work of
visual art;68
2) The Right of Disclaimer: "to prevent the use of his or her name
as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create;
69
3) Another Form of the Right of Disclaimer: "to prevent the use of
his or her name as the author... in the event of a distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation; '70
65. The Act specifically says "sign." Although a court might be willing to interpret this word
broadly (to include stamping since many professional photographers use pre-made stamps that
bear their names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc. to identify photographs), if a photographer
wishes to have her work come within the Act's provisions, it would be wise for her to take the
extra time necessary to actually hand-sign and number each limited edition copy herself.
66. As noted above, the Act does not expressly require that an artist sign originals.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, and as a matter of copyright law, it is clearly advisable for
artists to sign originals as well as copies. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
68. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992). Professor Damich defines the right of
attribution as giving "the author the right to control the association of his name with the work."
Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 949.
69. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
70. Id. § 106A(2).
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4) The Right of Integrity: "to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be preju-
dicial to his or her honor or reputation;"7 1
5) A Higher Level of The Right of Integrity for Works of Recog-
nized Stature: "to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized
stature.
72
These five rights, the section 106A rights, are functionally discrete
forms of the right of attribution and the right of integrity.7"
II. CONTRACT
A. General Considerations
Artists are usually in relatively weak bargaining positions in the
United States. Numerous books and articles have tried to educate art-
ists in an effort to apprise them of their economic rights, the advan-
tages of drafting contracts, and of registering their copyrights.7' Most
artists, however, still create and sell their works without taking ade-
quate contract or copyright measures.7" The Act gives artists a fresh
opportunity. Now artists possess moral rights in their artwork not
71. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A). This right is, however, subject to certain exceptions when the work
"has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such a way that removing the work from
the building will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
... ." Id. § 113(d); see infra Part II.G.3.
72. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(3)(B) (West Supp. 1992). The statute provides that a destruction
that results from either intentional conduct or gross negligence is presumed to be a violation of
this right. However, the language of the statute appears to grant artists of works of recognized
stature the right to prevent destruction under any circumstances (i.e., whether through
intentional conduct, gross negligence, or otherwise, e.g., ordinary negligence). See also infra note
185 regarding the definition of "gross negligence."
73. In her statement at the Subcommittee Hearings, Professor Jane C. Ginsburg of Columbia
University School of Law, elaborated on these moral rights, noting that they:
promote ... the interests of artists and the public alike. [They] benefit artists by assuring
their rights to recognition for the works they have created and by protecting the works
themselves against destruction or mutilation. These safeguards may enhance the creative
environment in which artists labor. Equally important, these safeguards enhance our
cultural heritage. The attribution right not only affords basic fairness to artists, it promotes
the public interest by increasing available information concerning artworks and their
provenance, and by helping ensure that that information is accurate. The integrity right
helps preserve artworks intact for all of us to enjoy.
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6924.
74. See supra note 2.
75. The Act is "user friendly" for artists in several respects. For example, artists are not
required to register the copyright to works as a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit for violation of
any of the § 106A rights. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West Supp. 1992). Artists are required to
register as a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit for violation of any of the "economic" rights in
§ 106 of the Copyright Act. Id, Similarly, artists are not required to register the copyright to
their works as a prerequisite to obtaining statutory damages or attorneys' fees. Id. § 412.
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previously recognized by federal law.7 6 Congress' recognition of these
rights can enhance artists' bargaining power in drafting and negotiat-
ing contracts.
One may, legitimately, ask why artists should concern themselves
with the effect of the Act on their contracts. After all, one of the prin-
cipal reasons for the passage of the Act was Congress' perception that
artists were unable to secure moral rights for themselves through writ-
ten contracts precisely because they had such weak bargaining
power. 7  Indeed, there are a number of situations in which having no
written contract may be advantageous for artists. For example, free-
lance artists ensure that they will own the copyright to their works by
refraining from signing any agreements. In Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid,7" the U. S. Supreme Court (Justice Marshall
writing for a unanimous Court) held that freelance artists own the
copyright to their works done on commission unless the parties agree
in a signed writing that the work will be a work for hire and the work
falls within one of nine narrowly defined categories.79 Thus, if free-
76. Some would argue that artists have always possessed these rights by virtue of natural law.
Nevertheless, one could argue that the Act, if nothing else, memorializes these rights that have
always existed underjus naturale. See supra note 8.
77. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 488; see also H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915, 6918.
78. 490 U.S. 730, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
79. Id. at 741-42, 109 S. Ct. at 2173-74. The U.S. Copyright Act defines a "work made for
hire" as follows:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work,
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as
an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a
"supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work
by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining,
revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
"instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and
with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Reid, the federal circuit courts had split in interpret-
ing this section of the Copyright Act. The Second Circuit had held that the work of an
independent contractor (such as an artist or photographer) could be considered a "work made
for hire" under the Copyright Act's definition even if it did not fall within the nine enumerated
categories of subsection (2) of the § 101 definition. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738
F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984), rejected by Community for Creative
Nonviolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The Aldon court had held that a sculpture created by
an independent artist could be a work made for hire, even if there was no written agreement, if
the commissioning party had exercised a sufficient amount of supervision and control over the
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lance artists sign nothing, they can be certain that they will own the
copyright to their work. Similarly, in a recent article, Professor Gins-
burg noted, and quite rightly so, that "the very informality of art work
commissions" and the "handshake deal[s]" that are most common in
art transactions "may work to artists' advantage" because artists can-
not waive their section 106A rights unless they agree to do so in a
written agreement signed by them.80 Again, as was the case in the
work for hire situation, artists who sign nothing can be certain that
they have not waived any of their moral rights.
B. Waiver
The very fact that the Act permits artists to waive the section 106A
rights is one of the most important factors for artists to consider in
drafting and negotiating contracts."1 In order to waive these rights, an
artist must expressly agree to the waiver in a written instrument signed
by him or her. 2 The written instrument must identify the work to
which the waiver is intended to apply and must specify which of the
section 106A rights the artist intends to waive.8 3 Here the importance
of drafting agreements becomes manifest. Buyers can draft purchase
agreements for works of visual art that include boilerplate waivers of
the section 106A rights.84 Artists also can take the offensive by draft-
ing their own boilerplate, stating that the artist expressly does not
artist's creative process. Id. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, had held just the opposite: that
a work created by an independent contractor could not be considered a work made for hire
unless it fell within one of the nine categories of subsection (2) and the parties had agreed in
writing beforehand that the work would be a work made for hire. Easter Seal Soe'y for Crippled
Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 981 (1988). In Reid, the Supreme Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's interpretation,
holding that:
the language and structure of § 101 of the Act do not support either the right to control the
product or the actual control approaches. The structure of § 101 indicates that a work for
hire can arise through one of two mutually exclusive means, one for employees and one for
independent contractors ....
Reid, 490 U.S. at 742-43 (footnote omitted).
80. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 488. For a more complete discussion of waiver under the Act,
see infra Part II.B.
81. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e) (West Supp. 1992). Professor Ginsburg argues that "the best
recognition of moral rights would countenance no waivers. This position, however, is probably
too extreme for the U.S., and Berne does not require it." Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 488
(emphasis added).
82. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
83. Id.
84. Professor Ginsburg laments this prospect, noting that
the requirement of specific waivers will in the long run simply enhance lawyers' and word
processors' employment opportunities, for lawyers will be engaged to devise language
sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to fend off" every conceivable exercise of moral
845
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waive the rights of attribution and integrity granted by section 106A
of the Copyright Act. By drafting a sales agreement as an offer to sell,
artists can assume a stronger bargaining position.
Co-authors possess the right to waive the section 106A rights for all
authors without authorization or agreement from other co-authors.85
Thus, it is prudent for artists who work with others as joint authors8 6
to reduce their agreements to writing. Each artist who is a joint
author could agree not to waive the section 106A rights without the
prior express written consent of his or her co-author(s).
Moreover, the power to waive or to refuse to waive the section 106A
rights clearly has economic value that artists can choose to exploit.87
Prospective art purchasers, no doubt, perceive the section 106A rights
as analogous to easements, encumbrances, or other "clouds on title" in
real estate. Purchasers pay more for real estate when the title is clear
than not or when they obtain a warranty deed as opposed to a quit
claim. Similarly, prospective art purchasers can be expected to pay
higher prices for works of visual art when the artists have waived their
section 106A rights as part of the bargain. Thus, by granting section
106A rights to artists, Congress has, in essence, given an added eco-
nomic value to artists.88
rights. This would defeat the purpose of compelling artists and art work owners to reflect
on and negotiate over the genuine need to alter or destroy the work.
Ginsburg, supra note 7 at 489. She does find some solace, however, in the fact that the Act
directs the U.S. Copyright Office to study the use of moral rights waivers. Id.
85. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(1) (West Supp 1992); Ginsburg, supra note 7 at 489; see also
Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 966 (criticizing the power of joint authors to waive the
§ 106A rights on behalf of their fellow joint authors: "In the context of moral rights... it is
difficult to understand why one author's evaluation of his personality should take precedence
over the other's, possibly causing irreparable harm to both.").
86. The Copyright Act defines a "joint work" as "a work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977).
87. Professor Damich takes a contrary position. He argues that "[a] waiver provision would
largely undermine the purpose of federal moral rights legislation by eliminating moral rights in
situations of unequal bargaining power." Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 966. His
opposition to an artist's power to waive the § 106A rights is clear. He argues that moral rights
are "theoretically personal rights" and as such, "they fall into the ca-egory of rights which, in
American law, has traditionally been subject to restraints on the freedom of contract" Id. at 967.
He adds that "because artists ordinarily have little or no bargaining power, they fall into another
category that has traditionally been tolerant of restraints on freedom of contract." Id. (footnote
omitted). He does, however, concede that Article 6bis of the Berne Convention does not
mandate that moral rights must be either inalienable or unwaivable. Id.
88. It is clear, however, that Congress is unsure about waiver. The legislative history reveals
that Congress wanted to be extremely cautious. According to House Report 514:
The Committee recognizes that these rights are personal to the author and that, because of a
relatively weak economic position, the author may be required to bargain away those rights.
It also recognizes that routine waivers of the rights will eviscerate the law. On the other
846
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One possibility that the Act does not directly address is the prospect
that artists could transfer the right to waive the section 106A rights.
The Act does recognize that the "right to waive" is essentially an addi-
tional right granted to artists by virtue of section 106A. 9 The Act
does not expressly prohibit artists from transferring the right to waive
the section 106A rights in a contract. House Report 514, however,
supports the view that Congress never intended such a contract to be
effective. 90 Obviously, transferring the right to waive section 106A
rights would be tantamount to transferring the section 106A rights
themselves. 91
C. Transfer And Duration
L Inter Vivos Transfer
The Act makes it clear that artists cannot transfer any of the section
106A rights inter vivos.92 Congress takes the position that these rights
are regarded as extensions or outgrowths of an artist's personality, and
therefore, ought not be lent or sold.93 Congress' decision to prohibit
inter vivos transfers of the section 106A rights is a double edged
hand, the Committee believes that to proscribe waiver would be to inhibit normal
commercial practices.
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6928.
In addition, the Act mandates that "[t]he Register of Copyrights shall conduct a study on the
extent to which rights conferred by subsection (a) of section 106A of title 17 United States Code
[Le., the § 106A rights], have been waived." Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650 § 608(a)(1), 104 Stat. 5128, 5132. The Act also directs the Register of Copyrights to submit
a preliminary report to Congress not later than two years after the date of enactment of this act
and a final report not later than five years after the date of enactment of this act on the results of
its study of waiver. Id. § 608(a)(2).
89. For example, the legislative history notes that "the authority to waive them [i.e., the
§ 106A rights] ... vest[s] after the author's death in those people named in the author's will."
H.R. REP No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6929.
90. See, eg., id. at 18-19, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6928 (stating that "[w]aivers will be valid
only if the parties follow the rules set forth in subsection (e)(1) [requiring that artists must sign
the waiver specifying the work to which the waiver is intended to apply]"). House Report 514
also states that the recipient of the waiver "may not subsequently transfer the waiver to a third
party .... [but that rather] [a]ny third part[y] must obtain waivers directly from the author." Id.
at 19, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6929 (emphasis added).
91. For a discussion of the transfer of the § 106A rights, see infra notes 92-125 and
accompanying text.
92. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(l) (West Supp. 1992). Professor Damich holds fast to the view
that moral rights should not be assignable, stating, "If moral rights are assignable, then there is
always the possibility that they were assigned for money rather than because the author reposed
particular confidence in the assignee to protect the author's moral rights." Damich, VARA 1990,
supra note 3, at 990 n.238.
93. See supra notes 7-8, 73 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6925 (quoting the statement of John Koegel
who testified that "[a]n artist's professional and personal identity is embodied in each work
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sword. The inability to transfer the section 106A rights can be viewed
as either beneficial or detrimental to artists. Some scholars have
argued that prohibitions of this type (i.e., limitations on an individual's
freedom of contract) are imposed to advance specific societal goals.94
Graveson, for example, argues that the state prohibits certain transfers
because of the status of the parties involved. He contends that the
status of certain entities and individuals (e.g., employer versus
employee) tends to dictate the relative abilities of the parties to bargain
freely. Because of the imbalance of bargaining power, the state is justi-
fied in stepping in to regulate the contractual framework. Graveson
points to various housing laws, public transportation laws, minimum
wage laws, workers' compensation laws, and the like, as illustrations
of state legislation which, taking into account the status of the parties
involved, restricts freedom of contract in a constructive manner.
Thus, Graveson concludes that the state changes the rules of contract
(based on status) to help the condition of those who are of lowly sta-
tus. "Public policy decides whether any matter is one for private
agreement or of status."95 According to this view, by changing con-
tract law in this manner, the state creates a situation where "[flreedom
of contract is giving way in industry and agriculture to social welfare,
and the maintenance of a fairer standard of work and living."96 If this
is a valid analysis of why a state chooses to restrict freedom of con-
tract, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the Act's prohibition
on the transfer of section 106A rights is that Congress sought to pro-
tect artists. Apparently, Congress was trying to rectify an imbalance
of bargaining power between artists and buyers.
Others argue, however, that restraints on freedom of contract like
this are entirely unwarranted and ill advised.97 In their book The Eco-
nomics Of Contract Law, Kronman and Posner concede that some lim-
its on freedom of contract are justified.9" For example, they suggest
that the statute of frauds (i.e., the limitation that certain contracts
must be in writing in order to be enforceable) is a desirable restraint
because it is "an efficiency-promoting device whose constraints reduce
created by that artist. Each work is a form of personal expression (oftentimes painstakingly and
earnestly recorded).").
94. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 100-03 (1983); R. H. Graveson, The
Movement from Status to Contract, 4 MOD. L. REV. 261, 270 (1941),
95. Graveson, supra note 94, at 269.
96. Id. at 271.
97. See, eg., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 21, 31, 103-11 (1981); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 253-67 (1979);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 84-88 (3d ed. 1986).
98. KRONMAN AND POSNER, supra note 97, at 253-54.
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the cost of contracting and thus facilitate rather than retard the volun-
tary transfer of entitlements." 99 On the other hand, they forcefully
contend that other limits on freedom of contract, like the non-transfer-
ability of the section 106A rights, are inappropriate:
However, while many limitations on freedom of contract may be con-
sistent with even the strongest conception of individual autonomy, at
least one class of limitations is not. These are limitations which may be
called paternalistic. As we use the term, a limitation on an individual's
freedom of contract is paternalistic if the sole justification for imposing
it is to promote or protect the individual's own welfare (or happiness or
good). If a particular limitation is imposed in order to reduce the costs
of the bargaining process (for example, by insuring its procedural pro-
priety), or to protect the interests of third parties, it can be justified on
nonpaternalistic economic grounds.'0°
Although the section 106A rights are commonly referred to as "per-
sonal" as contrasted with the section 106 "economic" rights,101 just as
the right of artists to waive them constitutes a potential economic
power, so too the right to transfer them would also constitute potential
economic power. By granting section 106A rights to artists but
prohibiting their inter vivos transfer, Congress has taken away with
one hand what it has given with the other. If Congress is correct in
assuming that artists as a general rule have a status inferior to that of
buyers, then, arguably, allowing them to sell the section 106A rights
actually would enhance their power to bargain. In essence, if the sec-
tion 106A rights were transferable inter vivos, then artists would have
five additional, individual rights that they could sell for a profit. 102
2. Duration and The Possibilities of Post Mortem Transfer
For works created on or after June 1, 1991 (the Act's effective date),
the section 106A rights expire with the artist. 103 In the case of joint
authorship, the rights expire upon the death of the last surviving joint
author."m Thus, joint authors would be well advised to provide for
99. Id. at 253.
100. Id. at 254.
101. See supra note 9.
102. It must be admitted, however, that if, in the real world, the superior bargaining power of
buyers forces artists to waive the § 106A rights, then the right to sell a waiver is merely illusory.
103. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Professor Ginsburg convincingly argues
that this limitation on duration is probably not "Berne-compatible," citing Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention requiring that moral rights "be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights .... " Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 484.
104. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
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transfer of their rights to their heirs in a will.° 5 Although an artist of
a joint work may provide for transfer of the section 106A rights in a
will, Professor Damich vehemently argues that artists should not be
able to transfer moral rights in a will to anyone other than their
"heirs." ' 0 6 He contends that "[a]llowing moral rights to pass to some-
one other than an heir would allow the author to sell his moral rights
by contractually agreeing to make a will under which the moral rights
would be transferred to another."107 He does, however, concede that
artists might have greater confidence in someone other than their
spouse or children, and thus, may want to transfer their section 106A
rights to that someone else in a will. 108 Nevertheless, Professor
Damich believes that artists should not be permitted to transfer these
rights motivated by profit but rather solely to protect the personal
rights.109 He makes this argument, however, in the midst of arguing
that all section 106A rights should last for as long as the section 106
rights (the so-called "economic rights").110 The Act, as a general rule,
does not extend the section 106A rights beyond the author's life."11
The Act protects not only works created after the Act's effective
date, but also any work created prior to that time, provided that the
artist had not transferred title to the work.112 For works of visual art
created prior to June 1, 1991, the Act provides tha, if title to the work
"has not.., been transferred from the author" then the section 106A
rights shall endure as long as the copyright endures." 3 As a general
rule, for example, this means that if an artist created a sculpture on or
105. Congress expressly recognized this possibility, noting that
the rights of attribution and integrity, and the authority to waive them, vest after the
author's death in those people named in the author's will. If the author's will does not
dispose of the rights, they will vest through intestate succession. State laws on testacy and
intestacy will govern these situations.
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6929.
106. Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 992.
107. Id. He notes that "[t]he current Copyright Act reflects concern regarding this outcome.
The Copyright Act limits the post mortem exercise of the power of termination to the author's
surviving spouse and children, and makes the power of termination inalienable inter vivos." Id.
(citing to 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), (5) (1988)).
108. Id.
109. Id. He concludes that "inter vivos contracts regarding will provisions that affect moral
rights should not be enforceable" because "[o]therwise, the author could effectively alienate his
rights for the post mortem period without the possibility of repenting an anti-personal decision."
Id. at 992-93 n.252.
110. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 103; infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
112. Presumably this protection could apply to limited editions owned by the artist-even if
the artist had transferred title to the original and/or all other copies of the limited editions.
113. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992). The Act states: "With respect to works of




after January 1, 1978,114 but before June 1, 1991, and did not sell it
before then, the section 106A rights will last the life of the author plus
an additional fifty (50) years."' This provision of the Act makes it
clear that the section 106A rights will survive beyond the artist's death
for works that were created but not sold prior to June 1, 1991.
Thus, the section 106A rights can endure beyond the artist's life in
two circumstances: 1) in the case of joint authorship; and 2) when the
artist created but had not transferred title to a work of visual art on or
before May 31, 1991. If a joint author wished to contract, inter vivos,
to transfer her section 106A rights in her will, the promisee would be
purchasing a right contingent upon the risk that the artist would pre-
decease her joint author(s). Such a contract is merely aleatory and,
generally speaking, enforceable in American law.1 1 6 In such instances
where the existence of post mortem section 106A rights is dependent
upon chance, it does not seem offensive to allow artists to contract for
rights conferred by subsection (a) [Le., the § 106A rights] shall endure for a term consisting of
the life of the author." Id. § 106A(d)(1).
The Act further provides:
With respect to works of visual art created before the effective date ... of the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been transferred
from the author, the rights conferred by subsection (a) [L.a, the § 106A rights] shall be
coextensive with, and shall expire at the same time as, the rights conferred by section 106.
Id. § 106A(d)(2).
Because the Act does protect some works that were created prior to June 1, 1991-namely,
those works of visual art that artists had not transferred title to (i.e., sold or given away) on or
before May 31, 1991-and because it is likely that a tremendous number of works fall into this
pre-Act category, it is important to understand just what the duration possibilities are for those
works. For these pre-Act works, the Act specifies that the § 106A rights will be the same as the
rights granted in § 106 (the so-called "economic rights"). The Copyright Act delineates the
duration of these rights in §§ 302-304. Id. § 302-04 (West 1977).
For pre-Act works created on or after January 1, 1978, but on or before May 31, 1991, the
§ 106A rights will last the life of the author plus an additional fifty years. Id. § 302(a). In the
case of a jointly authored work of visual art created during this time window, the § 106A rights
will last for the life of the last surviving joint author plus an additional fifty years. Id. § 302(b).
For pre-Act works "created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain
or copyrighted," the general rule is that the § 106A rights will last the life of the author plus an
additional fifty years (and fifty years after the life of the last surviving joint author in the case of
jointly authored works of visual art). Id. § 303. However, "[i]n no case ... [does] the term...
expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is published on or before December 31, 2002,
the term... [does] not expire before December 31, 2027." Id.
For pre-Act works that were registered under the Copyright Act of 1909, the § 106A rights
can last for up to 75 years after the date of initial registration, provided that the registrations to
the works are renewed in a timely fashion. Id. §§ 304(a)-(b).
114. The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective on January 1, 1978. Thus, the new
provisions regarding copyright duration became effective on that date. Id. §§ 302-305; see also
supra note 113.
115. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West 1977); see also supra note 113.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1979).
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that risk any more than it is offensive to allow insurance companies to
write life insurance policies. Even where artists definitely possess sec-
tion 106A rights that will last hfter their death, 17 like the prohibition
on inter vivos transfers, it seems decidedly paternalistic to prevent art-
ists from taking advantage of whatever contracts they can to enhance
their financial standing.11 Although public policy may well dictate
that certain contracts ought to be void,119 public policy should
encourage artists-a group that traditionally has been unable to reap
rewards from contracts-to use contracts as freely as possible.120
Society should not prevent artists from transferring their section 106A
fights to others (especially if the transfer actually occurs at a time
when the artist has leapt into the arms of Thanatos). This contractual
freedom is all the more desirable because such agreements offer eco-
nomic benefits to artists during their lifetime. This is different from
permitting artists to transfer their section 106A rights inter vivos.' 21
Arguably, if artists could transfer their section 106A rights inter vivos,
it would always be possible for an artist to regret the transfer and wish
that she had not sold them. On the other hand, when artists transfer
section 106A rights post mortem, they will always retain the right to
exercise them during their lifetime. Furthermore, they retain the right
to draft a will in breach of the inter vivos contract, i.e., a will that fails
to transfer the section 106A rights to the promisee. Drafting a will in
breach of the inter vivos contract would force the promisee to sue the
artist's estate. Arguably, the promisee would sue for specific perform-
ance, contending that, because section 106A rights are unique, specific
performance would be appropriate. 122 With this eventuality in mind,
artists could prevent the promisee from obtaining specific performance
by providing for liquidated damages in the inter vivos contract. 23
Because artists may be able to garner significant advantages, both
under the Act and contractually, if their section 106A rights survive
them, artists should, if possible, document that any given work was
created but not sold prior to June 1, 1991. To that end, artists should
date their works themselves or keep a log that reflects dates of crea-
117. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
119. See generally WALZER, supra note 94, at 100-03; supra notes 94-96 and accompanying
text.
120. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of why even inter vivos transfers of § 106A rights may be desirable, see
supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
122. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357-369 (1979).
123. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text regarding the availability and suitability
of liquidated damages in matters of § 106A rights.
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tion. 124 If artists keep records specifying which works they created
but did not sell before June 1, 1991, they should recite in future sales
contracts that, because the work was created but not sold prior to that
date, the section 106A rights shall subsist for as long as the rights
conferred by section 106.125 This would create a record that, on its
face, would be persuasive if the duration of the section 106A rights in
a particular work were ever questioned.
D. Liquidating Damages
By incorporating provisions dealing with the section 106A rights
into contracts, artists may provide for liquidated damages in the event
that the other party violates any of the section 106A rights, or in the
event that the other party impedes the artist's ability to obtain or exer-
cise any of the section 106A rights.126 The essence of the section 106A
rights is to protect the value of an artist's "honor or reputation."127 It
is manifestly difficult to assign a precise dollar value to an artist's
honor or reputation. It is even more difficult to forecast just how
much, in terms of dollars and cents, any given act would actually
diminish an artist's honor or reputation. Therefore, provided that the
parties make a good faith effort to estimate the loss that an artist
would incur due to a violation of one of the section 106A rights, courts
should uphold liquidated damages provisions dealing with section
106A rights. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that
liquidated damages may be "reasonable in light of the anticipated or
124. See supra note 50 regarding the necessity of a date in a valid copyright notice.
125. See supra note 113.
126. See infra Part II.G.
127. See generally 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West Supp. 1992). An artist's ability to vindicate the
rights afforded by this section is premised on whether a defendant's conduct damages the artist's
"honor or reputation." When an author is unable to claim authorship of a work, that inability is
considered potentially injurious to his or her honor or reputation. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
Similarly, when an artist is incorrectly identified as the author of a work that he or she did not
create, that inaccurate identification is considered potentially damaging to his or her reputation
as well. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B). The Act also presumes that when an artist's work has been
distorted, mutilated, or modified in a manner that would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, it would, therefore also be potentially injurious to his or her honor or reputation if he
or she were unable to prevent the use of his or her name being displayed as the author of that
work in its distorted, mutilated, or modified state. IM. § 106A(a)(2). Likewise, an artist's
prerogative to prevent intentional distortions, mutilations, or modifications (and in the case of "a
work of recognized stature," any intentional or grossly negligent destruction) of a work is
premised upon the potential injury to the artist's "honor or reputation." Id.
§§ 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B). For a more detailed discussion of these rights, see infra Part II.G.
Professor Damich has noted that "violation of moral rights is akin to a dignitary tort [and
thus] adopting the damages provisions of the Copyright Act, which are aimed at economic loss,
is inappropriate." Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 994.
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actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of
loss. '28 Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) states
that liquidated damages are appropriate in "an amount which is rea-
sonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasability of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." 12 9
In many respects, the economic impact of liquidating damages is
similar to a waiver of the section 106A rights. The benefits of liquida-
tion, however, would only flow to the contracting party, third party
beneficiaries, or assignees. Conversely, a waiver would be construed in
rem as to the work generally. Liquidation may be advantageous for
both artists and other parties to the transaction because, by liquidat-
ing, the parties essentially predetermine the value of the purchaser's
breach.
E. Additional Practical Considerations: Common Law and U. C. C.
In addition to obtaining economic leverage through waiver and liq-
uidation, artists may benefit by using written contracts for the sale,
rental, or any other transfer of their works. For example, the statute
of limitations is generally longer for contract causes of action than for
suits under the Copyright Act. 130 When artists create their own docu-
ments to use as a contract for sale-i.e., "offers" that buyers can
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b (1979). Comment b explains
that
[Tiwo factors combine in determining whether an amount of money fixed as damages is so
unreasonably large as to be a penalty. The first factor is the anticipated or actual loss caused
by the breach. The amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the actual
loss that has resulted from the particular breach, even though it may not approximate the
loss that might have been anticipated under other possible breaches .... Furthermore, the
amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the loss anticipated at the time
of the making of the contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss .... The
second factor is the difficulty of proof of loss. The greater the difficulty either of proving
that loss has occurred or of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty .... the
easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable.
Id.
129. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1989).
130. The Copyright Act provides that a civil claim must be "commenced within three years
after the claim accrued." 17 U.S.C.A. § 507(b) (West 1977). The Uniform Commercial Code
establishes a four-year statute of limitations "after the cause of action has accrued." U.C.C. § 2-
725(1) (1989). The Uniform Commercial Code also adds that for purposes of warranty, a cause
of action accrues "when tender of delivery is made." Id. § 2-725(2). Most jurisdictions in the
United States have a six-year statute of limitations for common law ointract actions. Robert D.
Marshall, The Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to Construction Contracts, 28
EMORY L.J. 335, 341 n.26 (1979). Notable exceptions to the six-year statute of limitations are:
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, and North Carolina (three years); California and
Texas (four years); Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Virginia (five
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"accept"-they become the masters of the terms of acceptance.13 1 In
fact, by incorporating the section 106A rights in their contracts, artists
can virtually ensure that offerees cannot reject the section 106A rights
while at the same time attempting to accept title to the work. The
U.C.C. makes it possible for artists 1) to explicitly state in their offers
that acceptance is limited to the precise terms of the offer, and 2) to
state explicitly in their offers that they are giving notice of a prior
objection to any new terms in the contract that the buyer may attempt
to add in an acceptance.1 32 In fact, the U.C.C. provides that when an
offeree's purported acceptance includes a material alteration of the
offeror's terms, such an attempt to alter is ineffective.1 33 Arguably, if
an artist were to make section 106A rights part of her sales contract,
an acceptance that rejected any of those section 106A rights should be
construed as a "material alteration" and thus ineffective.
1 34
However, if the buyer is a merchant, there may be some question as
to whether the contract should be considered "between merchants."
This raises the question of whether an artist is considered a
"merchant" under the U.C.C.
The U.C.C. defines a "merchant" as
years); Montana (eight years); Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, West Virginia, and Wyoming
(ten years); Kentucky and Ohio (fifteen years); and Indiana (twenty years). Id.
131. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.12, at 132 (1982).
132. U.C.C. § 2-207 provides as follows:
(I) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable
time after notice of them is received.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1989) (emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
133. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1989). Note the language of subsection (2)(b) stating that additional
terms do not become part of a contract when the additional terms "materially alter it." Id. § 2-
207(2)(b).
134. Official Comment 4 provides:
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter" the contract and so
result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party
are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchantability of fitness for a
particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty normally attaches; a clause
requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery,
where the usage of trade allows greater quantity leeways; a clause reserving to the seller the
power to cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any invoice when due; a clause requiring
that complaints be made in a time materially shorter than customary or reasonable.
Id. § 2-207 cmt. 4.
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a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.135
In fact, in addition to section 2-207, a number of other U.C.C. pro-
visions have special effect when a party is considered a "merchant" or
when a transaction is characterized as "between merchants." 13 6 Per-
haps one of the most important consequences of the characterization
of a person as a "merchant," is the obligation of "good faith." The
U.C.C. expressly imposes an obligation of good faith in all transac-
tions. 13 7 For nonmerchants, the U.C.C. defines "good faith" as "hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."1 38 This is a
subjective standard. However, for merchants, the U.C.C. imposes an
objective standard of good faith. The official comments to the U.C.C.
state that
good faith is expressly defined as including in the case of a merchant
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade, so that throughout the Article whenever a merchant appears in
135. Id. § 2-104(1). Of course, if an artist is not considered a "merchant," then, the
conclusion implicit in subsection (2) of § 2-207 is that the buyer's acceptance would still operate
as an acceptance but that all of the buyer's additional terms would fall away with no effect.
136. See, eg., id. § 2-201(2).
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) [i.e., circumvents the statute of
frauds] against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10
days after it is received.
Id. § 2-205 (written offers by merchants irrevocable even without consideration for the time
stated, or for a reasonable time, but not longer than three months); id. § 2-207(2) (additional
terms in acceptance or confirmation of a contract between merchants become part of the contract
unless: "(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, (b) they materially
alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reason-
able time after notice of them is received."); id § 2-209(2) (modification, rescission and waiver:
"A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot
be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on a
form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party."); id § 2-314(1)
(implied warranty of merchantability applies when "the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind"); see U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1989) (special rights attach to creditors of a seller
when the seller is a merchant); id. § 2-403(2) ("[E]ntrusting... goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives him [i.e., the merchant] power to transfer adl rights of the entruster to
a buyer in ordinary course of business."), infra notes 166-71 and aoompanying text.
137. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989) ("Obligation of Good Faith").




the case an inquiry into his observance of such standards is necessary to
determine his good faith. 139
Commercial art galleries, art auctioneers, and private art dealers
should be considered merchants under the U.C.C.140 Persons engaged
in these professions fall squarely within the language of U.C.C. section
2-104(l).141 On the other hand, "a collector whose occupation is not
related to art and who sells items from his or her art collection only
occasionally," would not be a "merchant" for U.C.C. purposes.142
There will be instances when the U.C.C. will control the contract
application of the section 106A rights and other instances when state
common law will control.1 43 This division exists because Article 2 of
the U.C.C. applies only to "transactions in goods." 1" The U.C.C.
defines "goods" as "all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
.... 145 Thus, for example, if a photographer brings an undeveloped
roll of film to a commercial developer, common law, not the U.C.C.
governs the contract between the photographer and the developer
because the developer is performing a service for the photographer
(i.e., the service of developing the roll of film). However, in a situation
where a photographer sells photographs to the public, the U.C.C.
probably governs that contract, because photographs are likely to be
considered "goods." Courts often experience difficulty, however, in
deciding whether the sale of certain types of art, photographs, and the
like should be considered a sale of "goods" or "services." Most
authorities generally characterize works of art as "goods" for purposes
of the U.C.C.146 Thus, an artist who assumes the role of contract
139. IM. § 1-201 cmt. 19. For purposes of Article 2, the concept of "good faith" is defined in
§§ 1-201(19), 1-203, and 2-103(l)(b).
140. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 2, at 65. The Uniform Commercial Code expressly
governs art auctions. See U.C.C. § 2-328 (1989).
141. See supra, text accompanying note 135.
142. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 2, at 66.
143. In his forward to the 1978 text of the U.C.C., Herbert Wechsler, Chairman of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Comercial Code, noted that "[b]etween 1958 and
1967, the U.C.C. (1958 Official Text) was enacted with but minor variations in all the states
except Louisiana, as well as for the District of Columbia." U.C.C. Official Text (1 th ed. 1989)
(forward to the 1978 Official Text).
144. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1989).
145. Id. § 2-105(1).
146. The U.C.C. provides that "[g]oods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale .... Id. § 2-
105(1). The Code also adds that "[g]oods must be both existing and identified before any interest
in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are 'future goods.' A
purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell."
Id. § 2-105(2). For authorities holding that works of art are "goods" under the U.C.C., see, eg.,
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drafter should consider the potential application of both the common
law and the U.C.C. to contracts dealing with "works of visual art" and
the section 106A rights. 47
F The Definition: "A Work of Visual Art"
Because the definition of "a work of visual art" 14 8 is so narrow, art-
ists must tailor certain agreements to help ensure that their works will
fit within the Act's definition. For example, if an artist relies on
another person or entity (a "printer") to create limited edition copies
of her original painting, drawing, or print, the artist ought to have a
written agreement with the printer expressly stating that the copies are
"limited edition" and also stating that the printer shall not make more
than 200 copies.149 In contracts with printers who make limited edi-
Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 F.2d 3 (Ist Cir. 1988); FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 9.2; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 2, at 58; Patty Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect" Attempted
Regulation of the Art Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 501 (1988). But cf HAWKLAND UCC
SERIES § 2-105:01 (1982) stating:
A contract by an artist to paint a portrait may be said to be a contract to specially
manufacture a picture, but it is not within the scope of Article 2, ecause its service aspect
predominates over the portion of the agreement that concerns goods, and it is not the kind
of transaction contemplated by the words "specially manufactured" as used in section 2-
105(1).
HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-105:01 (1982); see also Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th
Cir. 1974) (stating in dicta that a "contract with an artist for painting" was a paradigm example
of a contract for a "service, with goods incidentally involved").
An analogous controversy has arisen in recent years regarding the characterization of custom-
designed computer software. A thorough discussion of this issue is well beyond the scope of this
article. For a good summary, see Ricardo Meza, Note, Analysts Intl Corp. v. Recycled Paper
Prods., Inc.: Is Custom-Design ed Software a "Good" Under Article 2 of the U. C C ?, 3 SOFTWARE
L.J. 543 (1989); see also Roberta A. Holmes, Application of Article T)Vo Of The U.CC To Com-
puter System Acquisitions, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1982); Andrew Rodau, Com-
puter Software: Does Article 2 of The UCC. Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986); Bonna Lynn
Horovitz, Note, Computer Software As A Good Under the U.C C: Taking a Byte Out Of The
Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REv. 129 (1985).
147. Certain issues involving art transactions may, however, be covered by the peculiarities of
the Copyright Act if copyright law preempts the U.C.C. or common law. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301
(West 1977 & Supp. 1992).
148. See supra text accompanying note 39.
149. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Arguably, a careless printer could jettison an
artist's work beyond the Act's scope simply by creating more than 200 copies. Printers, in the
ordinary course of their business, make what are called "artist's proofs." Printers make artist's
proofs so that the artist can examine proofs in order to select one as the prototype for the limited
edition run of copies. Printers ordinarily make as many as 10% artist's proofs. Thus, in a
limited edition run of 200, a printer might make as many as 20 artist's proofs. Those 20 would be
marked "A.P." and signed but not numbered by the artist. The printer normally keeps one and
the artist gives the others as gifts or sells them separately. Artists and printers must reevaluate
this custom in light of the Act. In the event that the number of artist's proofs causes the total
number of copies to exceed 200, a court could, legitimately, construe the existence of the artist's
proofs as removing the work from the scope of the Act. It would be unfortunate, indeed, if this
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tion copies, artists would be well advised to include a provision speci-
fying the number of "limited edition" copies to be made, and expressly
alerting the printer that breach of this provision will seriously jeopard-
ize the artist's rights."' To that end, artists should consider estimat-
ing the damages that they are likely to incur from a printer's breach
that causes any given work to fall outside of the Act's definition. The
artist should insist on that sum as liquidated damages if the printer
breaches."' Artists should educate printers and explain the serious-
ness of this potential breach. In addition, because of the signature
requirement, 5 2 in their agreements with printers, artists should
demand that the printer promise to make the "limited edition" copies
available to them so that they may sign and number the copies.' 53
When sculptors authorize multiple copies ("cast, carved, or
fabricated"' 54), they must be certain that those who create the copies
do not exceed 200 in number. 5 As in the relationship between artist
and printer, 56 a sculptor ought to have a written agreement with
those who create the cast, carved, or fabricated copies that expressly
limits the number of allowable copies to 200 or less.' 57
common industry practice were to inadvertently prevent a work from being considered a "work
of visual art" subject to the protections of § 106A. The legislative history takes the position that
"a printmaker who creates a limited edition must show that the edition consists of 200 or fewer
copies." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
615, 6923; see supra note 47. Professor Damich has questioned the logic of using the number 200
arbitrarily. Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 976. He notes that the number 200 "does not
seem to correspond with the exhaustion point of a lithographic stone or a metal plate.... ." Id
He makes the same point with respect to photographic negatives as well. Id. For more about the
requirements for photographs as "work[s] of visual art," see supra text accompanying notes
59-67.
Professor Ginsburg interprets this provision to mean that "if a work is first published in a
limited edition of two hundred or less, and subsequently is published in a larger edition, the
second publication will not deprive the limited edition of protection." Ginsburg, supra note 7, at
481 n.20. The plain language of the Act, however, makes this position somewhat dubious.
150. Professor Damich has noted the apparent incongruity of discussing "limited editions" of
paintings and drawings: "The limited edition provision grammatically seems to modify 'painting,
drawing, print, or sculpture,' but the concept of a limited edition painting or drawing, as opposed
to print or sculpture, requires some thought. Presumably, legislators contemplated reproductions
of paintings and drawings." Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 952.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
152. See supra text accompanying note 39.
153. Once again, it would be prudent for the artist to establish liquidated damages in the
event of the printer's breach. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
154. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(1) (West Supp. 1992).
155. See supra text accompanying note 39.
156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(1) (West Supp. 1992).
157. Again, like the artist-printer contract, the sculptor should consider demanding
liquidated damages in the event that the copyist creates more than 200 copies (thus placing the
sculptor's work outside of the Act).
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The requirement that photographs must be created "for exhibition
purposes only"1 8 makes it advisable for photographers to create con-
crete evidence indicating that their works are "produced for exhibition
purposes only."' 5 9 In order to build a paper trail showing that an
exhibition purpose exists, photographers should insert a clause in all of
their agreements representing that they "produce all photographs for
exhibition purposes only." Likewise, if they establish a corporation or
other formal/legal business organization, photographers should
include in the articles of incorporation or bylaws a similar statement
regarding the "exhibition purpose."'"
If the photographer does not print the limited edition copies herself,
she ought to insert a clause in her contract with the printer stating
precisely the number of limited edition copies allowed to be printed.16 1
G. The Section 106A Rights
L Attribution and Disclaimer
If artists wish to avail themselves of the right of attribution, 162 their
sales, lending, leasing, and other agreements should expressly state
that the artist's name will be prominently displayed as the author of
the piece. Artists may want to specify the size, typeface, and location
of the credit. Arguably, if a gallery were to refuse to give an artist
credit in anything bigger than microscopic typeface, such a refusal
would violate the author's "right to claim authorship. 1 63 This is not
entirely clear, however. The Act also states that decisions regarding
public presentation ordinarily shall not be considered a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of a work.)6 Although the excep-
tion for public display does not explicitly relate to the right of attribu-
tion, a gallery or other buyer may contend that it is not bound to
158. See supra text accompanying note 39.
159. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6923. The legislative history makes it clear that the photographer will have the burden of
proving that a photograph was produced "for exhibition purposes" only. Id.
160. Photographers can include similar language in brochures, business cards,
advertisements, etc. Such statements could provide documentary evidence regarding this
element of purpose. In the absence of such documentary evidence, photographers could be
forced to make self-serving statements about the reasons why they too], a particular photograph.
161. See supra text accompanying note 39. Photographers also ought to include a clause in
their agreements with printers that provides for liquidated damages and explains the seriousness
of a potential breach. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
162. See supra text accompanying note 68.
163. The Act expressly provides that "the author of a work of visual art-(l) shall have the
right-(A) to claim authorship of that work . 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(l)(A) (West Supp.
1992).




acquiesce to all of an artist's demands regarding the particulars of
public display since the Act's policy is clearly opposed to treating mat-
ters of public display as violations of the section 106A rights.' 65 Nev-
ertheless, Congress has declared that artists who create "works of
visual art" have the right to receive credit for their creations. Thus,
artists should not be reticent to demand the credit that they deserve.
The grant of the right of attribution to artists, however, raises
another difficult question: what is the legal effect of an artist's claim of
authorship? For example, suppose that artist A approaches a gallery
with a work of visual art. Suppose that artist A, relying on section
106A(a)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act, demands that the gallery display
her name as author of the work. The gallery complies. Shortly there-
after, artist B appears, and, claiming that she, not artist A, is the true
author, demands that the gallery remove artist A's name, and instead,
display her [artist B's] name. Suppose now that the gallery had
already sold the work to a purchaser when artist B made her claim.
Does artist A's claim of authorship create an express warranty to the
gallery? 166 Did the gallery's display of artist A's name on the work
create an express warranty to the purchaser? 67 Even if the claim of
authorship does not create an express warranty, 68 a claim of author-
165. The Act expressly states that "modification of a work of visual art which is the result of
... the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the
modification is caused by gross negligence." lId § 106A(c)(2).
166. The U.C.C. provides that there are several ways to create an express warranty:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty,
but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely
the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989). Subsection (1)(a) apparently would make a claim of authorship of a work
of visual art an express warranty. See id. § 2-313(1)(a).
167. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) suggests that the answer is yes.
168. See Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd,
351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Term. 1974). In Wzei the trial court held that a written
description of a work of art in an auction catalogue (claiming that the work was painted by
Raoul Dufy) created an express warranty that a disclaimer was ineffective to dissolve. Id. On
appeal, the court reversed, relying on three factors: 1) at the time of the sale involved, neither the
applicable statute nor case law gave rise to any warranty of authenticity based on a seller's
expression of opinion or judgment; 2) Park-Bernet's catalogue "gave [a] leading and prominent
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ship may create either an implied warranty of merchantability, 16 9 or in
some circumstances, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. 170  However, in order for the implied warranty of
merchantability to apply, the warrantor must be a "merchant."17 1
The right to disclaim is probably of limited contractual value. At
the very least, however, the right to disclaim works that are not, in
fact, created by an artist does give artists the opportunity to spell out
in agreements with galleries, for example, that the gallery has a con-
tractual obligation to ensure that an artist's name will be associated
only with works actually created by that artist.
2. Disclaimer of Works Prejudicially Altered 17  and Integrity
a. Consequences of Prejudicial Alteration
The Act creates two rights that hinge upon whether a work has
been or is in danger of being distorted, mutilated, or modified in a
place . . . to a clear [and] unequivocal disclaimer of any express or implied warranty or
representation of genuineness .... ;" and, 3) buyers in circumstances like those of the plaintiffs,
where there was no evidence of fraud or intentional deceit by the sellers, assume the risk that
they might be mistaken in judging the works to be originals, have the opportunity to bid
accordingly, and cannot complain when it turns out that they made a bad bargain in a situation
clearly calling for buyers to beware. Id at 912; see also Gerstenblith, supra note 146, at 509-10.
169. The U.C.C. provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified .... a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind ....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1989).
170. The U.C.C. provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified ... an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id. § 2-315.
171. See supra text accompanying note 135.
172. See supra text accompanying note 69.
173. For purposes of this article, the author has adopted the term "prejudicial alteration"
(and logical, grammatical variants of this term, e.g., "prejudicially altered") as a shorthand for
the Act's cumbersome phraseology: "distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation ....... See 17 U.S.C.A.




manner that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. 174
First, the Act furnishes a hybrid right that is fundamentally a cross
between integrity and disclaimer.175 As was noted,176 this provision
secures for artists the right to prohibit their names from being associ-
ated with their own works in instances where the works have been
prejudicially altered. 177 In addition, the Act gives artists the right "to
prevent any intentional" prejudicial alteration. T1 7  Thus, in addition to
the right to disclaim authorship of works that have been prejudicially
altered, artists have the right to prevent these prejudicial alterations ex
ante. Although the Act does not attempt to define "distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification" in a positive way, it does specify certain
things that will not be considered a "distortion, mutilation, or other
modification." First, "[t]he modification of a work of visual art which
is the result of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materi-
als is not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification... ."179 Fur-
thermore, the Act dictates that "[t]he modification of a work of visual
art which is the result of conservation, or of the public presentation,
including lighting and placement, of the work is not a... distortion,
mutilation, or other modification... unless the modification is caused
by gross negligence."1 ' Thus, from a contractual perspective, the
right to disclaim authorship of prejudicially altered works permits art-
ists to place the burden on transferees to promise to remove the artist's
name from a protected work in the event that the work is prejudicially
altered at some time in the future. An agreement should contain a
clause specifying the types of distortion, mutilation, or modification
which the parties agree shall be considered prejudicial to the artist's
honor or reputation. For example, the agreement could say: "The fol-
174. Id. §§ 106A(a)(2), 106A(a)(3)(A).
175. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
176. See supra text accompanying note 70.
177. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
178. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
179. Id. § 106A(c).
180. Id. § 106A(c)(2). This a far cry from the heinous example of mutilation cited in the
legislative history where
Representative Markey described the actions of two Australian entrepreneurs who cut
Picasso's "Trois Femmes" into hundreds of pieces and sold them as "original Picasso
pieces." This is clearly not a presentation question. On the other hand, the Committee
believes that the presentation exclusion would operate to protect a Canadian shopping
center that temporarily bedecked a sculpture of geese in flight with ribbons at Christmas
time.
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6927
(footnote omitted) (citing Snow v. The Eaton Centre, Ltd., 70 C.P.R. 2d 105 (Ont. High Ct.
1982)). For a definition of "gross negligence," see infra note 185.
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lowing types of distortion, mutilation, or modification shall be deemed
by the parties prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation: X, Y, and
Z." Artists may wish to state that the list is meant to be illustrative
but not exhaustive, and that the occurrence of any one of the afore-
mentioned events shall be a condition precedent to the transferee's
removal of the artist's name. An artist may wish to include a clause
that would require transferees to notify the artist in writing at a speci-
fied address, to determine whether the artist considers a certain distor-
tion, mutilation, or modification to be "prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation." After all, who is in the better position to determine
what would or would not be prejudicial to an artist's honor or reputa-
tion than the artist herself? On the other hand, perhaps the issue of
whether any distortion, mutilation, or other modification is prejudicial
to an artist's honor or reputation should be subject to an objective
rather than a subjective test. One might ask whether an alteration
would be prejudicial to a "reasonable artist" under the circumstances.
Neither the Act itself nor the accompanying House report make the
standard clear."' 1 Thus, in the absence of any judicial decisions con-
struing the language, artists and buyers are free to negotiate their own
interpretations.
181. As has been noted, the linchpin issue for assessing damages under the Act is the extent
of injury to the artist's honor or reputation. See supra note 127. Congress was adamant that this
standard should have nothing to do with the American notion of injury to reputation in
defamation. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6915, 6925. House Report 514 states:
The Committee believes that the best approach to construing the term "honor or
reputation" . . . is to focus on the artistic or professional honor or reputation of the
individual as embodied in the work that is protected. The standard used is not analogous to
that of a defamation case, where the general character of the plaintiff is at issue In a suit for
a violation of the rights accorded.. ., any evidence with regard to the latter is irrelevanL
Id. (emphasis added). Although it may seem difficult for American courts to think about injury
to reputation without reference to the law of defamation, Congress' admonition makes perfect
sense. The Copyright Act provides the possibility for plaintiffs to recover statutory damages
without any proof of actual injury. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West Supp. 1992). The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that unless defamation plaintiffs prove malice (i.e., that a defendant's statement
was false or the defendant made the statement recklessly disregarding whether it was true), they
cannot recover damages for anything other than "compensation for actual injury." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Thus, if an artist were to recover statutory dam-
ages using a defamation standard for injury to reputation as a benchmark, arguably, such a
recovery would be the same as recovering presumed (i.e., not actual) damages in a suit for defa-
mation. Gertz teaches that such a recovery is unconstitutional. Presamably an award of statu-
tory damages under § 504(c)(2) of the Copyright Act, "where the copyright owner sustains the
burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully... " would
not bar the defamation analogy to an injury to honor or reputation under § 106A since the
willful nature of the infringement would probably satisfy the malice requirement under Gert
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As is true in the case of the right to disclaim prejudicially altered
works, an artist should attempt to establish those types of intentional
alterations that he or she would deem "prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation."'' 2 Having formulated such a list, artists can then
expressly state in a contract that those listed alterations would be prej-
udicial. Once again, artists should state that the list is meant to be
illustrative not exhaustive.
Also, if artists aspire to prevent transferees from intentionally alter-
ing their works in a prejudicial manner, they should draft a contract
provision requiring transferees to notify them in writing at a desig-
nated address, in the event that they (the transferees) ever contemplate
any alterations of the work. In this way the artist would have the
opportunity to determine, in advance, whether she considers such an
alteration prejudicial.
The "public presentation" exception"8 3 is, however, relatively clear.
Congress did not intend to permit artists who are displeased with ele-
ments of presentation, such as framing, lighting, or proximity to other
artists in a show to have the ability to notify the exhibitors and allege
that such elements constitute a distortion, mutilation, or other modifi-
cation of the work, thereby forcing the exhibitor to remove the artist's
name or else be subject to liability. Nevertheless, since the Act's defi-
nition of distortion, mutilation, or other modification does not encom-
pass the display of works, it is even more desirable for artists to
protect themselves contractually. If an artist wishes to have a work
framed in a particular manner, not framed in a particular manner, or
not framed at all, the artist should provide those specifications in a
written agreement. Similarly, if an artist wishes his or her works to be
exhibited in a certain location in the gallery or lighted in a certain
way, the only viable control he or she can assert over such details is by
contract.18 4
The modification of a work by a conservator or exhibitor that is
prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation can be considered a dis-
tortion, mutilation, or modification sufficient to trigger the author's
right of integrity only if the distortion, mutilation, or modification is
the result of gross negligence.185 Therefore, artists may desire to pre-
182. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
183. Id. § 106A(c)(2). See also supra text accompanying note 180.
184. It is, however, doubtful whether such a provision could bind subsequent transferees.
185. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(2) (West Supp. 1992). The Act does not define "gross
negligence." The leading single volume treatise on tort law explains that "gross negligence"
has been described as a failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use.
Several courts, however, dissatisfied with a term so nebulous, and struggling to assign some
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serve this right contractually. For example, in their written agree-
ments with buyers, artists should recite that the buyers agree to notify
the artist in the event that the gross negligence of an exhibitor or con-
servator causes distortion, mutilation, or other modification that
would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation.
Conservators, framers, and exhibitors also may wish to create agree-
ments in which the artist consents to specific procedures, framing
techniques, and the like. As long as the conservator, framer, or exhibi-
tor can show that she gave the artist the opportunity to make an alter-
native decision, a court should not consider the framer's or exhibitor's
conduct as "gross negligence." '86 For example, if a conservator were
to inform a painter that specific types of processes could preserve the
life of a painting better than others, and then the painter selected a
cheaper, less effective, process, perhaps the conservator should draft a
written agreement to reflect the painter's decision. This could be a
form similar to "informed consent" forms used by doctors for their
patients. 187
b. Works "Of Recognized Stature"
The Act gives artists more extended rights vis a vis destruction of a
work "of recognized stature."' 88 The use of the word "destruction" is
somewhat curious. It seems quite logical to assume that all destruc-
tions of a work, by definition, would constitute either a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification.189 On the other hand, all distor-
tions, mutilations, or other modifications are not also destructions. 90
House Report 514 suggests that the term "destruction" contemplates
more or less definite point of reference to it, have construed gross negligence as requiring
willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or such utter lack of all care as will be evidence
thereof--sometimes on the ground that this must necessarily have been the intent of the
legislature. But it is still true that most courts consider that "gross negligence" falls short of
a reckless disregard of the consequences, and differs from ordibary negligence only in
degree, and not in kind. There is, in short, no generally accepted meaning; but the
probability is, when the phrase is used, that it signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or
inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed.
1984).
186. Id.
187. See generally Harnish v. Childrens Medical Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982); Cross v.
Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
188. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (West 1991).
189. See, e.g., id. §§ 106A(a)(2), 106A(a)(3)(A) (addressing artists' rights as regards
"intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work"); see also supra note 179
and accompanying text.
190. Professor Damich has noted that Article 6bis itself has "no explicit right against




that the work "no longer exists." '191 The House Report's characteriza-
tion implies that the destruction of a work occurs when the work has
been physically obliterated. In other words, the work no longer exists
in the same recognizable physical state. Presumably, burning a work
beyond recognition or applying chemicals to a work causing it to
decompose would fit within the meaning of destruction in the Act.
However, the House Report's example of destruction is not particu-
larly helpful. The House Report describes an instance where two
sculptures "were sold for scrap metal."' 92 Clearly it was not the sale
that rendered the sculptures "destroyed," but rather it was their subse-
quent reduction to scrap metal. In other words, the fact that they had
been changed to the point where they were no longer recognizable as
the sculptures that they had been is what rendered them "destroyed."
The line between destruction and distortion, mutilation, or modifica-
tion is not necessarily a bright one. 193
In addition, the Act fails to define "a work of recognized stat-
ure.' 194 Presumably, the drafters, at the very least meant "a work of
... prejudicial to [the author's] honor or reputation.'" Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at
950.
191. H.L R p. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6926.
192. Id.
193. The distinction may be analogous to the common law distinction between trespass to
chattels and conversion in tort law. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 185, §§ 14-15, at
85-106. Professor Damich has recognized other pertinent discrepancies between an artist's right
to prevent destruction as opposed to the right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or other
modification:
The Act recognizes a right "to prevent destruction of a work of recognized stature" and
then adds: "and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of
that right." The added provision not only emphasizes that destructions that have already
occurred are violations, but also provides that intentional or grossly negligent destructions
are ipso facto violations of the right. But if a destruction has occurred through mere
negligence, no cause of action apparently exists. Because the right to prevent destruction is
not limited to intentional and grossly negligent acts, there is an asymmetry between the first
and the second provisions, although it is difficult to think of examples of impending
destructions that are not intentional. If there can be no impending destructions that are not
intentional, then the second provision is broader than the first because it protects against
grossly negligent as well as intentional acts.
The right against destruction is also asymmetrical with the right against modification
because the right against destruction is not limited to destructions that would be prejudicial
to the author's honor or reputation. The right against destruction is also broader than the
right against modification because the former provides for recovery for grossly negligent as
well as intentional acts. The right against destruction, however, is narrower than the right
against modification because the former is limited to works "of recognized stature."
Damich, VARA 1990, supra note 3, at 962 (footnote omitted).
194. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106A(a)(3)(B), 101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992).
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visual art of recognized stature." '195 The interpretation of this term
likely will provide fertile ground for debate and expert testimony as to
whether a work ought to be characterized as possessing "recognized
stature." Arguably, any work executed by a particularly well known
artist should be considered "of recognized stature" regardless of that
individual work's quality.1 96 Perhaps decision makers will be forced
to seek lists of "who's who in the art world" or similar publications.197
In terms of contract law, this provision probably has the least effect
of any of the Act's provisions on the ordinary artist. The provision
dictates that the artist of a "work of recognized stature" has the right
to prevent others from destroying it.198 Although an artist might be
able to obtain an injunction to prevent destruction from occurring as a
result of intentional or grossly negligent conduct, this right has limited
value at the contract bargaining table. Perhaps -atists might want a
transferee to agree in a signed writing that a work has "recognized
stature." Aside from some type of estoppel, such a recitation is likely
to carry little weight. There is a chance, however, albeit somewhat
tenuous, that a transferee's promise not to destroy a work either inten-
tionally or through gross negligence could be useful to an artist. At
the very least, it would provide a contract remedy for the artist, and
195. Since the Act's provision regarding destruction of works of recognized stature does not
expressly state that it applies only to "works of visual art" as that term is defined in the new
§ 101 definition, it is conceivable theoretically that it could also apply to works that are not
necessarily "works of visual art." Such an interpretation, however, would be anomalous with the
rest of the Act's coverage and scope.
196. Professor Ginsburg makes a point similar to this one, suggesting that "substitution of the
term 'artist of recognized stature' might have rectified the problem." Ginsburg, supra note 7, at
480 n.19. Nevertheless, she concludes: "Such a step would, however, provoke further anomalies
because it would penalize the unknown, or up-and-coming artist." Id.
197. The Kennedy bill, which was not adopted, had stated that the "court or other trier of
fact may take into account the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectos of fine art, curators of art
museums, conservators of recognized stature, and other persons involved with the creation,
appreciation, history, or marketing of works of recognized stature." S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S6811 (daily ed. June 15, 1989). An analogou, provision in the California
law states that in determining whether a "work of fine art" will be considered "of recognized
quality, the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art,
curators of art museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(1) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
Instead of making moral rights protection contingent on the quality or recognized stature of a
work, some state statutes opted for a minimum market value approach. See, eg., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42-116s(2) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that a "work of fine art" must have "a market
value of at least two thousand five hundred dollars").
198. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
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therefore, a longer statute of limitations and potentially greater inci-
dental and consequential damages. 199
3. The Building Exception
The Act addresses one particular practical problem that can affect
the integrity of a work of visual art. In cases where artists create
works that are ultimately "incorporated in or made part of a building
[hereinafter referred to as a "building work"] in such a way that
removing the work from the building will cause the destruction, dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work... ," special
new rules apply.2" If the artist who created a building work con-
sented to the installation of the work in the building prior to June 1,
1991, then the artist loses three significant section 106A rights. First,
she is not entitled to prevent the use of her name as the author of the
work in the event of a prejudicial alteration. 0 1 Second, she is not enti-
tled to prevent any intentional prejudicial alteration itself.2 2 Third,
she is not entitled "to prevent any destruction of" the work in the
event that the work is considered "a work of recognized stature.' 203
Simply stated, if an artist consented to installation of a building work
prior to June 1, 1991, the artist has ipso facto lost the right of dis-
claimer and the right of integrity as to that particular work.2 4 The
artist apparently still retains the right of attribution and, in the
unlikely event that she consented to the installation of a work that she
did not, in fact, create, the artist still may prevent the use of her name
on that work.205
The same loss of section 106A rights applies in cases where both the
artist and the building owner execute a written instrument on or after
199. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. The statute of limitations for violations
under the Act would be three years. 17 U.S.C.A. § 507 (West 1977).
200. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d) (West Supp. 1992).
201. Id. § 113(d)(1)(B).
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text regarding "a work of recognized
stature."
204. The Act states that when the artist has consented to installation prior to June 1, 1991,
"then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply." 17
U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992). Paragraphs (2) and (3) of § 106A(a) provide that
artists: 1) have the right to prevent their names from being associated with their works when the
works have been altered in a manner that would be prejudicial to their honor or reputation;
2) have the right to prevent intentional alterations of their works that would be prejudicial to
their honor or reputation; and 3) have the right to prevent destruction of a work of "recognized
stature." See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.




June 1, 1991 "that specifies that installation of the work may subject
the work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification
by reason of its removal . ..."" This provision of the Act does not
state that the parties understand that installation "will" or even "is
likely" to cause destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modifica-
tion of the work. Nor does it differentiate between any destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work from a
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
that is prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. Here again, the
importance of the artist assuming the role of contract drafter is appar-
ent. A transferee need only state that the parties agree that removal of
the work may cause destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modi-
fication of the work, in order to extinguish the majority of the artist's
section 106A rights.2 "7 An artist, on the other hand, could simply
remain silent and preserve the section 106A rights, or she could draft a
provision stating that, in the event that the work is incorporated in or
made part of a building in such a way that removing the work from
the building will cause destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work, the artist expressly reserves all of the rights
of integrity, attribution, and disclaimer granted by section 106A of the
Copyright Act, including paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A.
Either position may be rather extreme in practical terms. A trans-
feree's flat insistence that an artist forfeit these rights may be unrea-
sonable. Similarly, an artist's insistence on retaining these rights when
a work will be incorporated into a building in such a manner that its
removal is likely to cause destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification may be equally unrealistic. What if a business one day
decides to move its corporate offices and needs to dismantle a sculp-
ture in order to take it to the new space? Parties may wish to pursue a
middle ground. Perhaps a contract provision could grant the artist the
right either to remove the work herself or to supervise the removal or
even to have a right of first refusal to remove or to supervise removal.
In the event that the artist is unavailable, the contract could provide
that a designated third party would remove the work or supervise
removal. Provisions like these would be an appropriate compromise
between totally squelching artists' rights of integrity and disclaimer,
and unnecessarily handcuffing a building owner whose needs are likely
to change over time.208
206. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
207. For the precise rights affected, see supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
208. Professor Ginsburg notes that the Act itself "seeks to prevent the artist from holding the
building hostage to the artworks." Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 486.
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In situations where removal is possible without destruction, distor-
tion, mutilation, or other modification of the work, all of an artist's
section 106A rights persist even though the building owner may wish
to remove the work.2°9 The Act does, however, create two exceptions
to this general rule. If a building owner makes "a diligent, good faith
attempt210 without success to notify" the artist of her intent to remove
the work, the artist loses her rights of integrity and disclaimer.211
Also, if the building owner successfully notifies the artist (or the art-
ist's heir(s)), and the artist (or her heir(s)) fails to either remove the
work or pay for its removal within ninety days, the artist forfeits her
rights of integrity and disclaimer.
III. CONCLUSION
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 provides myriad opportuni-
ties for persons who deal in the many facets of the creation and
exchange of art. This Article has shown that artists now must reevalu-
ate and restructure their contracts with others. Artists should be cau-
tious about how they create, what they create, and how many copies
they create because the Act narrowly defines the art that comes within
its scope. Artists must also tailor their agreements with others to max-
imize the benefits these newly fashioned rights provide because the Act
establishes specific rights that are not necessarily the same as the tradi-
tional European moral rights. It is imperative that artists realize the
value that these rights add to their works. Artists must exercise them
carefully and waive them sparingly.
The Visual Artists Rights Act creates a wealth of opportunities for
artists and others who deal in the art market to explore contractual
solutions to their concerns. It would be unfortunate if the art world
were to treat the Act merely as an afterthought, using it to redress
grievances only in the wake of a disappointing occurrence. The future
of U.S. copyright law may hold additional moral rights for visual art-
ists, 212 but in the meanwhile, artists, galleries, buyers, and others
209. 17 U.S.C.A. § 113(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
210. d § 113(d)(3). The Act presumes that an attempt is diligent and in good faith if the
owner sends notice by registered mail to the artist at the most recent address of the artist
recorded with the Register of Copyrights. The Act mandates that rules be enacted establishing a
registry system in the Copyright Office. Id Those regulations were recently promulgated.
211. Id. (section 113(d)(3) implies that the building owner must wait at least until she receives
notice from the post office stating that the attempt to deliver the registered letter was
unsuccessful).
212. For example, the Act requires Congress to explore the feasibility of artists' resale
royalties. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 603(e)(1), 104 Stat. 5128,
5129.
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should not neglect the chance to incorporate the new moral rights of
artists into their agreements. Unless artists become aware of these
new rights and learn how to exercise them, simply having them in the
abstract will be of little value. Artists can use contracts to put these
rights to work and to garner the benefits of them.213
213. Although Professor Macaulay has explained that academics often overestimate the
potential of contract planning in the real world, the opportunities for artists to use the Act's
provisions are, indeed, a splendid addition to American law, and artists would be remiss were
they to neglect the contract possibilities. See generally Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of
Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 465.
Vol. 67:827, 1992
